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Abstract
This paper describes crop revenue insurance, discusses the important factors in successful contract writing and 
presents a robust analytical procedure for assessing combined crop yield and price risks. The feasibility of crop 
revenue insurance for Chinese maize, soybean, wheat, cotton and rice markets is specifically addressed.
Increased crop demand, rising production costs and variable weather necessitate the use of agricultural insurance by 
producers, input providers and processors. Crop producers and agribusiness entities around the world are realizing 
that yield-based insurance alone will not offset the risk of adverse price movements during the growing season. 
Producers may, for example, achieve above-average crop yields only to find that total revenues have substantially 
declined due to price decreases. Properly constructed and rated, revenue-based crop insurance can provide superior 
risk management performance to producers. Revenue policies insure producers against declines in expected revenue 
below a guaranteed revenue amount and thereby aid in budget planning, securing bank loans and reducing credit 
costs to input suppliers.
The paper provides a brief discussion of revenue insurance for multiple crops in the United States, currently the 
largest user of crop revenue insurance. Revenue insurance adds price change into the indemnity equation, requiring 
use of correlated multivariate analyses. The analytical procedure for measuring revenue risks employs Monte Carlo 
modeling of the state-space comprised of correlated yield and price risks. This procedure is simply described using 
graphics. 
A successful application of revenue insurance in Brazil is described and contract elements deemed necessary for 
success are outlined. As discussed, to properly incorporate price risk, the indemnity index employed for measuring 
value change must satisfy five essential criteria. These criteria are applied to the major Chinese agricultural futures 
markets for maize, soybeans, cotton, wheat and rice. Conclusions on the feasibility of the successful development of 
revenue insurance for these crops are presented.
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1. Introduction
Increased crop demand, rising production costs and variable weather necessitate the use of agricultural insurance 
by producers, input providers and processors. Crop producers and agribusiness entities around the world are 
realizing that yield-based insurance alone will not offset the risk of adverse price movements during the growing 
season. Producers may, for example, achieve above-average crop yields only to find that total revenues have
substantially declined due to price decreases. Properly constructed and rated, revenue-based crop insurance can 
provide superior risk management performance to producers.
The benefits of revenue insurance to producers are reflected in the large and growing participation by 
policyholders in the United States. First offered on a pilot program basis in 1996, crop revenue insurance policies 
achieved almost $7 billion in premium and accounted for 75% of all multi-peril crop insurance (MPCI) premiums in 
2009. Over fifty percent of all U.S. MPCI policies sold in 2009 had indemnities linked in some manner to intra-
seasonal price changes of the underlying insured crop. 
Revenue insurance is now being extended beyond the U.S. borders to other countries and to other parties at risk 
in the vertical contracting chain. Alberta Financial Services Corporation (AFSC) offers, for example, revenue 
insurance on several provincial crops. AFSC has recently applied revenue insurance to live cattle in a fashion similar
to the U.S. livestock revenue protection policy. In the vertical contracting chain, several private trade credit 
insurance policies have incorporated an underlying revenue index as a second or dual trigger for indemnity 
calculation purposes. A specific application of revenue protection for an international grain company in the vertical 
contracting chain will be described below for Brazilian soybean production.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of crop revenue insurance and its potential application in 
China from a practitioners’ perspective. After a brief description of crop revenue insurance, the rating and pricing
procedure for the product is illustrated with simple graphics. The application of revenue insurance to Brazilian 
soybean production is discussed along with contract details important for successful risk management. Based on 
practical experience, the price index employed for measuring value change must satisfy five essential criteria. These 
criteria are applied to the major Chinese agricultural markets for soybeans, wheat, maize, cotton and rice. 
Conclusions on the feasibility for the successful development of revenue insurance for these crops are presented.
2. Crop Revenue Insurance
In its simplest form, crop revenue insurance is an extension of yield-based crop insurance policies but with the 
yield indemnity modified by unexpected price changes during the crop season. Revenue policies insure producers 
against declines in expected revenue below a guaranteed revenue amount and thereby aid in budget planning, 
securing bank loans and reducing credit costs to input suppliers. Crop revenue insurance also greatly benefits 
producers and processors that forward contract some portion of their expected output. The indemnity payment on a 
revenue policy helps the policyholder offset the combined losses of production and selling price especially when the 
forward contract has replacement cost provisions in the case of delivery shortfalls. For example, if a producer 
forward sells a portion of his crop and experiences a yield loss, the indemnity payment from a revenue policy would 
help pay not only for the production decline but also help offset market price increases potentially associated with 
the shortfall replacement.
Expected revenue is typically calculated prior to planting using an expected, or average historical, production 
multiplied against an expected harvest price index. The harvest price index could be comprised of expected cash, 
forward or futures market prices. In practice, the harvest price index is usually based on an average of harvest period 
futures contract prices calculated before planting. The expected harvest price is often called the base price. The 
revenue guarantee is a function of the expected revenue and a pre-selected percentage or coverage level. Sometimes 
a final revenue guarantee is calculated around harvest time and uses the higher of the base price and an estimated
harvest price. The estimated harvest price is determined using an average of end-of-season harvest futures contract 
prices. Actual revenue is computed using actual production and the harvest price. A revenue insurance indemnity is 
paid if the actual revenue is below the final revenue guarantee. 
To better understand the rating and pricing of crop revenue insurance, the basics of rating a yield-based crop 
insurance policy will be described. Over time, the loss experience for an average individual producer is generally 
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related to the crop characteristics, the production area and the weather. A group of producers in a particular 
township, county or province will generally exhibit yield risks over time in relationship to the time series of the
geographic region. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1 that portrays the evolution of provincial de-trended 
yield risks over time and the corresponding set of producers’ risk for selected years. When provincial yields increase 
or decrease around the expected (zero percent) trend level, the producer yield distribution within the province tends 
to shift in the same direction albeit with differing degrees of skew in the tails. A proper yield-based insurance rating 
analysis would sample across each producer at various coverage levels and all years to estimate loss costs.
Figure 1 – Times Series of Provincial Yield and Selected Cross-sectional Producer Yield Risks
In contrast to yield-base crop insurance, revenue insurance guarantees a projected amount of revenue rather than 
production. Therefore, price risk must also be assessed simultaneously with yield risk. Since price and yield changes
of agricultural crops tend to move in opposite directions on an aggregate basis, the negative correlation of price and 
yields must be factored into the rating equation for revenue policies. The essence of rating a crop revenue policy 
consists of calibrating the annual producer probability density functions to the corresponding provincial yield time 
series while incorporating the probability of a correlated price change.
Price risk is generally measured using a lognormal distribution with mean and standard deviations estimated 
using volatility implied by option market prices. Correlations between estimated yield and price movements may 
also be estimated using historical data. When the yield and price density functions are combined on a correlated 
basis, a Monte Carlo simulation procedure may be employed to calculate revenue insurance loss costs over a range 
of coverage levels. As described by Coble et.al. [1], this rating procedure can be accomplished in four steps: (1) 
calculate yield and price density functions, (2) estimate price and yield correlations, (3) simulate correlated yield and 
price events, (4) calculate estimated loss ratios at various coverage levels.
A graphic illustration of the Monte Carlo output is presented in Figure 2. Price and yield risks are presented as 
percent changes from zero. When prices increase greater than yields decline or when yields increase greater than 
prices decline, revenue increases on an elevated slope. The contour under the revenue surface is directly related to 
the assumed correlation of price and yield. Figure 2 also illustrates the downside protection or floor established by a 
75% coverage level revenue policy. Since yield-based and revenue-based losses may be generated simultaneously 
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Figure 2 – Monte Carlo Simulation Surface for Correlated Yield and Price Changes
using the same surface, loss costs and rates may be computed and compared over a variety of coverage levels. 
Relative revenue-to-yield-based crop insurance rates can thus be generated for analysis and marketing purposes.
3. Crop Revenue Insurance in Brazil
The implementation of soybean crop revenue insurance in Brazil by a consulting firm, Agro International,
for a major international grain company provides a case study for other crops and countries. The need in Brazil 
was for the protection of input costs advanced by an international agribusiness firm. This vertical contractor 
provided input expenses, such as seed, fuel and defensive chemicals, to producers in advance of planting and 
harvesting. In return, the producers contracted to forward sell their projected soybean production back to the 
contractor subject to disease and weather perils such as drought and rainfall at harvest.              
The major problem in developing a revenue product for Brazil was the ability to determine producers’ yields.
This data was essential for properly rating an insurance product and to determine if the farmer received 
adequate coverage for the loans he had accepted. In the initial stages, some University studies were found that 
presented average soybean yields over certain regions and area. This data was not, however, verifiable with 
any consistency nor did it provide producer-level data. By conducting producer interviews in the state of Matto 
Grosso, the consultants were able to determine that most producers had individual yield records, although 
somewhat inconsistent with the records received from the University. An analytical routine was developed to 
determine the correspondence of individual yields with University averaged-yield data. During the initial 
development period, the consultants found many producers were willing to discuss their needs and the type of 
coverage that they desired for protection in the event of significant weather perils or price volatility.
The next step was to determine how a revenue price index could be determined that would provide 
protection and at the same time be transparent for all to see and use. In discussions with producers throughout 
Brazil it was evident that most producers were fully cognizant of, and used, the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT) as reference pricing for their soybean sales. Based on this observation it was determined that the 
revenue policy could utilize the CBOT soybean futures contract as the indemnity mechanism.  It was also 
necessary to determine the appropriate contract month which would reflect the average harvest price when the 
majority of the soybean crop was harvested. Producer interviews determined that the May CBOT soybean 
contract would be the best value indicator to determine the harvest price. To determine the base price, the 
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revenue policy used the average price of the May contract during the month of September for the planting 
price. The harvest price employed the average price of the May contract during the month of March. 
The final revenue insurance product for Brazil relied on an individual actual production history (APH) to 
determine a yield and insure coverage level based on a percentage of that expected yield. This yield 
expectation is coupled with the planting price using the average of the May contract during the month of 
September and the harvest price of the May contract in March. If yields were less than the coverage level, the 
producer would be reimbursed for the reduction in yield by whichever price was higher, planting or harvest.
Payments for lower prices at harvest are calculated using the actual harvested volume multiplied by the harvest 
price. If the resulting harvest value is less than the planting guarantee, a payment would be made to bring the 
harvest value up to the level that it was at the inception of the policy. 
To enhance the probability of success for the program, a number of policy conditions and exceptions were 
implemented. Producers had to qualify for the revenue policy by demonstrating that their technical ability, 
machinery and management resources matched the expected productivity and production levels. To reduce the 
policy costs, prevented planting and replant costs were not covered perils. Overall liability for the revenue 
policy was limited to the loan amount that pre-financed the input costs. In addition, to discourage fraud and 
encourage contract fulfilment, multiple on-site farm inspections were made throughout the season, including 
planting, post-emergence, pod-filling, pre-harvest and post-harvest.
Although the actual performance measures and policy count are confidential, this private soybean revenue 
insurance program in Brazil will soon be entering its ninth year. From humble beginnings, the hectares insured
have grown by over ten percent each year without any government subsidization of premiums or losses. The 
producers and vertical contractor generally agree that the program has been a success.
4. Essential Criteria for Indexation of Price Risk
The preceding example in Brazil and the description of revenue risk rating methodology reinforce the need for 
accurate yield and reasonable price data to assess policy risk. It’s important to note that the Brazilian soybean 
revenue insurance policy did not incorporate a Brazilian futures contract for indemnity calculations. The important 
factor is the acceptance and use by Brazilian producers of the relative price change of CBOT futures for a 
representation of value change. Had a representative cash market price or other index of value been acceptable by 
the Brazilian producers, those alternatives could have been employed instead.
In essence the price change incorporated in the indemnity calculations is a type of value index. Over the course of 
many years and through study of many successful and unsuccessful cash and futures indices, a set of five criteria for 
a successful index may be identified. (For examples of various applications see Cole [2] and Cole et.al. [3].These 
five factors are: (1) standardization, (2) verifiable pricing, (3) frequent price dissemination, (4) competitive price 
determination, and (5) value representation.
Standardization is a basic feature of most futures and cash indexes. Participants need to know that the underlying 
commodity, futures deliverable or product is consistent and not changing over time. When the deliverable is not 
standardized as to quality and quantity market participants have difficulty placing a value on the index. Some 
uncertainty or change in the deliverable is acceptable as long as market participants understand the delivery rules 
and can adjust pricing to accommodate the variance. 
If the futures contract or index is based on a formula, the calculation and its inputs should be well understood and 
verifiable. Different parties to the same trade should be able to replicate and reasonably forecast the index value. For 
example, the monthly averaging process should be clearly defined and independent calculations should arrive at the 
same value. Otherwise, the pricing will suffer enlarged bid/asked spreads to accommodate calculation risk. Trades 
could also be contested if buyers and sellers disagree as to final value.
To gain general acceptance, recognition and usefulness as a risk measurement over time, the futures or cash index 
needs to be widely and frequently disseminated. Certainly the internet has made this more possible. But there are 
some products, such as weather indices, catastrophic insurance risks and even crop yield indices that have “died on 
the vine” since trading information and price dissemination were fairly infrequent. 
The fourth factor of success, competitive determination, is very important. No manipulation of trading, 
delivery or index inputs should exist. To accurately reflect value and the underlying risk, the futures contract 
or cash index employed as a price index in a revenue indemnity should consistently respond to free market 
forces.
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Finally, the fifth element of success is acceptance of value representation. Even if participants know an 
index is not completely accurate in its valuation, as long as it is a consistent measure of value change and no 
better alternative exists, it may be employed by the market to assess risk and return. Indices that fall into this 
category are Consumer Prices, Housing values and even Gross Domestic Product. Participants know these 
indexes are sometime inaccurate but, over time, the changes indicate general valuation and thus may be
incorporated in contracts for indemnity calculations.
5. Applying Indexation Criteria to Chinese Futures Contracts
Futures contract prices are natural choices for use as indemnity indexes in crop revenue insurance contracts.
Successful futures contracts imply that market participants are utilizing the product for hedging and price discovery 
purposes. Thus, almost by definition, agricultural futures contracts with substantial volume and open interest meet 
the five criteria set forward as conditions for success. Price information from harvest contracts during the pre-
planting phase may be used as expectations in the base price calculations. The final revenue guarantee would 
incorporate the average of the harvest futures prices some time before contract expiration.
The major agricultural futures exchanges in China are the Dalian Commodity Exchange (DCE) and the 
Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange (ZCE). Maize and soybean futures are traded at the DCE while cotton, rice and 
wheat futures are traded at the ZCE. These contracts are standardized, have verifiable pricing and have frequent 
price dissemination. The high volume of trading in these contracts implies competitive price determination and 
value recognition by dealers and traders in the Chinese agricultural markets.
Although the maize, soybean, cotton, wheat and rice futures markets show considerable growth in volume, a 
comparison with comparable U.S. futures markets is revealing. Table 1 presents the contract sizes for the five 
selected Chinese futures contracts along with their trading symbols. A comparative analysis is made with the 
analogous agricultural futures contracts in the U.S.  After converting metric tons into bushels or hundredweights, a 
general observation that results is that U.S. futures contracts are about 11 times larger in weight. (Contract 
conversion factors and calculations are illustrated in Appendix 1). A similar observation results when measuring 
contract value over time. Contract value is the multiplication of contract size and price. Using daily contract values 
and foreign exchange rates, the average value ratios of the selected agricultural futures contracts over the 2006 
through 2009 period were about a 9.5 ratio of PRC to US contract values.
These differences are understandable in terms of trading longevity and delivery characteristics. Agricultural 
futures have a much longer history and level of use by agribusiness in the United States. China’s agricultural futures 
markets are still relatively new and growing. In the U.S., delivery sizes were initially standardized using size of a 
train railcar (thus the term “cars” as a substitute for “number of contracts”). The commodity exchanges in China 
may be accommodating smaller delivery sizes by merchants, smaller average farm size and encouraging general use 
through smaller contract values. The differences in volume may also be a function of national production levels. 
Based on USDA estimates of five year average production, maize production in China is only 50%, and soybean 
production in China is less than 20%, of that in the United States. One should not expect these contracts to ever 
Table 1 – Contract Size and Value Equivalence Ratios
Contract U.S. Contract Size Ratio Value Ratio
Commodity Symbol Exchange Size Equivalent unit Symbol Exchange Size PRC/US PRC/US
Maize AC DCE 10 MT 393.7 bu C CME 5000 bu. 12.70 9.19
Soybeans AK DCE 10 MT 367.4 bu S CME 5000 bu. 13.61 9.51
Cotton VV ZCE 5 MT 110.2 cwt CT ICE 500 cwt. 4.54 3.12
Rice IRI ZCE 10 MT 220.5 cwt RR CME 2,000 cwt. 9.07 9.44
Wheat VN ZCE 10 MT 367.4 bu W CME 5000 bu. 13.61 11.84
Wheat VN ZCE 10 MT 367.4 bu MW MGE 5000 bu. 13.61 13.79
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eclipse U.S. trading levels. On the other hand, China produces almost twice as much cotton and wheat as the United 
States and dominates it in terms of rice production. Growth in these futures contracts over time could be substantial.
Table 2 compares the daily average of open interest, volume and 30-day annualized historical volatility by contract 
Table 2 – Annual Comparisons of Average Daily Statistics by Commodity Contract
Futures Contracts in the PRC Futures Contracts in the US Ratio Comparisons
AC Open Int. Volume GD\ı C Open Int. Volume GD\ı Maize PRC C.E.Vol. PRC/US GD\ı
2006 776,572 537,328 17.2 2006 156,593 181,287 23.9 2006 42,307 23.3% 72.0%
2007 1,066,400 467,031 15.9 2007 214,753 207,357 24.5 2007 36,772 17.7% 64.7%
2008 692,091 472,542 13.1 2008 223,538 232,038 39.1 2008 37,206 16.0% 33.4%
2009 312,244 132,999 16.9 2009 139,634 196,298 34.6 2009 10,472 5.3% 48.8%
AK Open Int. Volume GD\ı S Open Int. Volume GD\ı Soybeans PRC C.E.Vol. PRC/US GD\ı
2006 250,374 73,243 13.7 2006 364,211 87,848 19.2 2006 5,382 6.1% 71.5%
2007 664,914 391,194 19.8 2007 513,280 121,786 22.7 2007 28,748 23.6% 87.4%
2008 623,313 899,114 25.1 2008 443,405 138,976 45.6 2008 66,074 47.5% 55.2%
2009 326,732 344,182 13.5 2009 395,326 138,803 35.8 2009 25,293 18.2% 37.7%
VV Open Int. Volume GD\ı CT Open Int. Volume GD\ı Cotton PRC C.E.Vol. PRC/US GD\ı
2006 49,567 17,326 15.3 2006 156,593 18,599 23.9 2006 3,820 20.5% 64.1%
2007 78,445 23,324 12.0 2007 214,753 18,480 24.5 2007 5,142 27.8% 48.8%
2008 81,805 41,003 12.9 2008 223,538 24,227 39.1 2008 9,040 37.3% 32.9%
2009 86,091 65,489 10.2 2009 139,634 13,485 34.6 2009 14,438 107.1% 29.4%
IR Open Int. Volume GD\ı RR Open Int. Volume GD\ı Rice PRC C.E.Vol. PRC/US GD\ı
2006 2006 13,047 1,223 21.4 2006
2007 2007 16,504 1,380 17.4 2007
2008 2008 14,530 1,450 34.0 2008
2009 46,495 21,362 11.3 2009 9,880 1,084 26.5 2009 2,355 217.2% 42.5%
VN Open Int. Volume GD\ı W Open Int. Volume GD\ı Wheat PRC C.E.Vol. PRC/US GD\ı
2006 192,479 119,983 19.3 2006 429,636 62,730 30.1 2006 8,817 14.1% 64.0%
2007 254,887 311,416 15.8 2007 406,741 74,720 33.5 2007 22,885 30.6% 47.2%
2008 262,063 215,928 18.4 2008 345,437 74,183 50.4 2008 15,868 21.4% 36.5%
2009 153,496 52,501 12.1 2009 317,491 68,746 40.8 2009 3,858 5.6% 29.6%
MW Open Int. Volume GD\ı Wheat PRC C.E.Vol. PRC/US GD\ı
2006 49,037 6,268 25.3 2006 8,817 140.7% 76.1%
2007 55,814 7,040 27.7 2007 22,885 325.1% 57.0%
2008 41,953 3,823 58.1 2008 15,868 415.1% 31.7%
2009 35,438 4,014 30.1 2009 3,858 96.1% 40.1%
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over the last four years. As indicated in the second last column, contract equivalent volume (“C.E.Vol.” in the table)
for Chinese maize and soybean volumes are running on average about 17.5% of comparable U.S. contract volumes. 
In terms of cotton, rice and high protein wheat (the MGE contract in the U.S.), Chinese contract equivalent volume
has at times actually exceeded comparable U.S. futures volumes.
The ratios of historical 30-day volatilities in the last column of Table 2 indicate that Chinese agricultural futures 
prices are generally less volatile than their U.S. counterparts. These differences could be associated with many 
factors, such as lack of international arbitrage, use of price controls, state trading to balance inventories, less relative 
production uncertainty during the last five years or trading regulations on imports and exports. Interestingly, wheat 
volatility is lower than soybean volatility in China while the opposite is true in the United States. This difference 
was pointed out by Wang and Ke [4] in their analysis of futures market efficiency in China as a possible indication 
of public policy and regulation. A similar conclusion may be inferred from the correlations in monthly average price 
changes. Table 3 presents the correlations of the change in monthly average prices of maize, soybean, cotton, wheat 
and rice in the United States and China over the 2007 through 2009 period. In the United States, soybean and wheat 
prices were correlated at approximately the 60% level (highlighted in yellow). In contrast, soybean and wheat prices 
in China are correlated at only the 16% level despite the fact that U.S. soybean and Chinese soybean contracts are 
correlated at the 65% level. Additional study of relative price responses for Chinese wheat may be needed to 
determine competitive price determination and acceptance of value by producers for indexation purposes.
Table 3 – Correlations of Monthly Average Price Changes (2007 – 2009)
Maize Soybean Cotton Wheat Maize Soybean Cotton Rice Wheat Wheat
AC1 AK1 VV1 VN1 C 1 S 1 CT1 RR1 W 1 MW1
AC1 100.0%
AK1 38.4% 100.0%
VV1 11.9% 11.7% 100.0%
VN1 -9.6% 15.8% -0.8% 100.0%
C 1 32.0% 54.4% 21.6% -8.0% 100.0%
S 1 24.9% 65.5% 26.8% -2.7% 72.7% 100.0%
CT1 7.3% 23.5% 71.0% -7.8% 36.0% 54.1% 100.0%
RR1 16.3% 37.5% 27.4% 2.5% 45.9% 30.1% 25.6% 100.0%
W 1 -1.2% 40.6% 23.9% 19.3% 46.7% 63.1% 56.1% 13.9% 100.0%
MW1 -6.1% 40.8% 17.9% 17.9% 38.5% 59.6% 36.5% 20.5% 75.9% 100.0%
6. Conclusion
Revenue insurance is being increasingly used by producers and agribusiness concerns in the vertical contracting 
chain. The growth exhibited in the United States is likely to be manifested in other countries over time since the 
simultaneous protection of production and price is of great value to policyholders. Properly constructed and rated, 
revenue-based crop insurance can provide superior risk management performance to producers.
As illustrated by the Brazilian soybean revenue insurance case study, key elements of successful implementation 
of revenue insurance are the availability of producer yield data and the acceptability and recognition of value by 
producers of the price index selected for indemnity calculations. In addition to acceptability and recognition of value, 
other criteria for indexation success are standardization, verifiable pricing, frequent price dissemination and 
competitive price determination. These criteria generally apply to futures contracts exhibiting frequent use and high 
volumes of trading over time.
The maize and soybean futures contracts at the DCE and the cotton futures contract at the ZCE appear to meet 
these criteria. Some questions remain about price response and relative volatility of the wheat contract at the ZCE. 
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Although trading volume of the rice futures contract at the ZCE is growing rapidly and has great promise, the lack 
of trading data makes conclusions somewhat difficult given the recent initiation of trading.
A pilot program for revenue insurance on Chinese maize, soybeans and cotton could be developed in the future if 
several conditions were met. First, underlying producer data would need to be provided for analysis of relative yield 
risks and estimation of the producer probability distributions. Second, producer interviews should confirm 
recognition of value, price availability and acceptability of the respective DCE or ZCE futures contracts for price 
indemnity calculations. Third, a reliable and representative volatility analysis needs development to create the price
probability distribution since options on futures contracts are not traded at these exchanges to date. Once these 
conditions are satisfied, modeling of the revenue policy risks by coverage levels could deliver relative pricing 
estimates against yield-base contracts. This output would permit marketing tests with producers to determine 
usefulness and value. Discussions on the viability and acceptance by processors and other agribusiness concerns in 
the vertical contracting chain would also be valuable.
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8. Appendix 1 – Calculating Equivalent Contract Size
CME Maize (C) Size Units ICE Cotton (CT) Size Units
1 bushel (bu) = 56 pounds 1 hundredweight (cwt) = 100 pounds
1 contract (C) = 5,000 bushels 1 contract (CT) = 500 cwt
1 contract  (C) = 280,000 pounds 1 contract  (CT) = 50,000 pounds
1 metric ton (MT)= 2,204.6 pounds 1 metric ton (MT)= 2,204.6 pounds
1 contract  (C) = 127.01 MT 1 contract  (CT) = 22.68 MT
1 contract (AC) = 10 MT 1 contract (VV) = 5 MT
1 contract (AC) = 0.079 C 1 contract (VV) = 0.220 C
1 contract (C) = 12.70 AC 1 contract (CT) = 4.54 VV
CME Soybeans(S)or Wheat(W) Size Units CME Rough Rice (RR) Size Units
1 bushel (bu) = 60 pounds 1 hundredweight (cwt) = 100 pounds
1 contract (S) = 5,000 bushels 1 contract (RR) = 2,000 cwt
1 contract  (C) = 300,000 pounds 1 contract  (RR) = 200,000 pounds
1 metric ton (MT)= 2,204.6 pounds 1 metric ton (MT)= 2,204.6 pounds
1 contract  (S) = 136.08 MT 1 contract  (RR) = 90.72 MT
1 contract (AK) = 10 MT 1 contract (IRI) = 10 MT
1 contract (AK) = 0.073 S 1 contract (IRI) = 0.110 RR
1 contract (S) = 13.61 AK 1 contract (RR) = 9.07 IRI
